There is a dangerous package deal that emerged on the heels of the civil rights movement: the refusal to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, creed, or color. Let us not consider here the question of whether or not the state should be banning any form of discrimination at all in the course of men's private dealings. It shouldn't, whatever the moral status of such acts of discrimination.
The question is whether discrimination on the basis of religion is an immoral act. A religion is a chosen system of beliefs. The fact that most people uncritically adopt the religion of their families does not alter that fact and does not absolve a man of moral responsibility for the consequences of his beliefs in his life and in his interaction with others. If we repudiate discrimination on the basis of religion, why shouldn't we also demand equal consideration for those who believe that two and two is five or that Elvis lives?
Historically, religion has been given a special exemption from critical treatment because of the obvious stupidity of its claims. 'Yes religious dogma is obviously stupid, people realize you're not dumb enough to truly believe it, but don't go upsetting your grandma.' Thinking people basically all got together and voted to make this one a freebie. Sure we'd have to put up with an occasional gynecologist being murdered by anti-abortion wackos, but grandma must be placated.
Now the penitents are crashing planes into buildings. The exemption has to end. Your ideas are your choice. If they result in you helping to blow up innocent people, you cannot be spared the consequences any longer.
Ayn Rand perceived this 50 years ago. Bill Buckley rewarded the achievement of this seemingly clairvoyant insight by turning the conservative movement into something unpalatable for her. Now Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, and Richard Dawkins are coming around to see what's really on the line when respectability is granted to stone age metaphysics. Hopefully Europe will not lie bloody and inseminated under a crescent banner before thinking people start catching on.
Saturday, May 10, 2008
Thursday, February 7, 2008
Some Meta-Geometry
Geometry, in its original and most basic sense, is the study of distance relationships in the physical world. The concepts of point and straight line are what geometry starts with, but geometric reasoning itself does not tell us *which* line between two given points is a straight line. Whether we define straight lines ostensively, as was necessary in Ancient Greece, or we define them by reference to light rays, as some do today, the concept of straight line is a foundation block of and, therefore, must precede all other geometric analysis.
This is why the basic properties of straight lines constitute the postulates, not the theorems, of geometry. Such postulates are not self-evident primaries. They are inductions from experience in the physical world. If, for instance, we were to construct a very large triangle and measure the sum of its interior angles to be greater than 180 degrees, we cannot just reject the result out of hand because it violates Euclid's postulates. We might have to question these postulates.
If we do in fact define straight lines using light rays, we find that certain triangles wouldn't add to 180 degrees, depending on their proximity to massive objects. This is what is meant by the idea that the universe is non-Euclidean. It is ultimately a matter of physics, because physics is the study of external objects in general (including those used to define straight lines).
Nevertheless, based on the totality of the physical evidence (including observations of quantum non-locality and also subtler indications provided by modern quantum field theories), I do not personally believe that the universe is non-Euclidean. It looks more likely that using light to define straight lines is defective. But this is, again, a question of physics -- not a question to be resolved by scrutinizing standard geometrical concepts.
This is why the basic properties of straight lines constitute the postulates, not the theorems, of geometry. Such postulates are not self-evident primaries. They are inductions from experience in the physical world. If, for instance, we were to construct a very large triangle and measure the sum of its interior angles to be greater than 180 degrees, we cannot just reject the result out of hand because it violates Euclid's postulates. We might have to question these postulates.
If we do in fact define straight lines using light rays, we find that certain triangles wouldn't add to 180 degrees, depending on their proximity to massive objects. This is what is meant by the idea that the universe is non-Euclidean. It is ultimately a matter of physics, because physics is the study of external objects in general (including those used to define straight lines).
Nevertheless, based on the totality of the physical evidence (including observations of quantum non-locality and also subtler indications provided by modern quantum field theories), I do not personally believe that the universe is non-Euclidean. It looks more likely that using light to define straight lines is defective. But this is, again, a question of physics -- not a question to be resolved by scrutinizing standard geometrical concepts.
Tuesday, January 1, 2008
The True Believer and Western Politics
I have been rereading parts of Eric Hoffer's The True Believer, written in 1951, and am impressed by his insights into the psychology of collectivism. Hoffer identifies the organizing psychological force for man in his sense of individual efficacy. When a man sees himself as efficacious, when his own creative energy is regularly given form in the material world, he is content. Otherwise he is frustrated. And then he seeks to sublimate this frustration by merging his unworthy ego into the group -- the family, the tribe, the church, the nation, the race, or the movement. This closely parallels Ayn Rand's analysis of creators vs. second-handers already in The Fountainhead.
Hoffer proceeds to offer a taxonomy of the frustrated second-hander, dissecting the psychological malfunction characterstic of each variation. He points out that the various social organizations sought as an outlet by the second-hander are inherently competitive with each other. There is only so much social fodder to go around, and what the church gets, e.g., the nation must give up. Hoffer is mainly interested in competition between the more traditional outlets -- family, church, nation -- on the one hand, and mass movements on the other. The movement -- communist, Nazi, environmentalist, or evangelical -- frequently seeks to undermine the hold of traditional social structures. First it must demagnetize the potential convert from his local field in preparation to realign him with its own polarity.
These social forces bring about a certain kind of interesting second-order, cooperative effect. As the revolutionary movement seeks to undermine prior social orders, a reactionary conservative movement may seek to strengthen them simply to defend against the former. This kind of dynamics seems to underly the political landscape of the modern West.
It had always appeared to me an unfortunate historical accident that the advocates of economic freedom are for the most part also the advocates of traditional religion and "family values," i.e. the political Right. But perhaps it is no accident. Having performed the liberal economic revolution of the 18th century in America and Europe, what was once itself a kind of mass movement for individual liberty increasingly faced threats from other, competing movements rather than from the old order itself. When it was in its ascendancy, the liberal movement strove to disassemble extant social bonds, and its doctrine of individualism was a great asset. Having gained power, the liberal movement seems to have jettisoned this doctrine in an act of political expediency.
As in the old order, so in capitalism, the second-hander has a vast numerical majority in society. Now, further separated from the basic chores of his own survival by the fruits of capitalism, and in possession of ever greater amounts of leisure time, his frustration is magnified. The potential for new, contrary mass movements increases proportionately. The second-hander always has the power to shape his own intellect anew, to cultivate and express his own creative energy in whatever field and at whatever level his ability allows. But such a process, even when not begun on a second-handed precursor, is difficult and sometimes painful. The easier and more frequent shunt is a reversion to some form of collectivism.
In order to avert the disaster posed by modern collectivist movements, the liberal order was faced with two alternatives: (i) perfect the psychology of uncountable numbers of frustrated mediocrities or (ii) shunt them away from the revolutionary collectivism of modern mass movements and into the age-old collectivism of family and church. Fight syphilis by microscopic scrutiny of every resident microbe or by the equal-opportunity toxin of arsenic. The former (i) requires a grand, philosophical kind of revolution on at least the same order as the political revolutions being opposed -- a philosophic revolution whose very identity few in the liberal movement have ever grasped. The latter (ii) offers a concrete prospect for the current political epoch, and the liberal movement took it.
The danger is always that a dose of arsenic sufficient to subdue the invading microbe may be too great for the patient to withstand. But at least now I understand why the arsenic was tried in the first place. Ultimately, we need a better immunological technology.
Hoffer proceeds to offer a taxonomy of the frustrated second-hander, dissecting the psychological malfunction characterstic of each variation. He points out that the various social organizations sought as an outlet by the second-hander are inherently competitive with each other. There is only so much social fodder to go around, and what the church gets, e.g., the nation must give up. Hoffer is mainly interested in competition between the more traditional outlets -- family, church, nation -- on the one hand, and mass movements on the other. The movement -- communist, Nazi, environmentalist, or evangelical -- frequently seeks to undermine the hold of traditional social structures. First it must demagnetize the potential convert from his local field in preparation to realign him with its own polarity.
These social forces bring about a certain kind of interesting second-order, cooperative effect. As the revolutionary movement seeks to undermine prior social orders, a reactionary conservative movement may seek to strengthen them simply to defend against the former. This kind of dynamics seems to underly the political landscape of the modern West.
It had always appeared to me an unfortunate historical accident that the advocates of economic freedom are for the most part also the advocates of traditional religion and "family values," i.e. the political Right. But perhaps it is no accident. Having performed the liberal economic revolution of the 18th century in America and Europe, what was once itself a kind of mass movement for individual liberty increasingly faced threats from other, competing movements rather than from the old order itself. When it was in its ascendancy, the liberal movement strove to disassemble extant social bonds, and its doctrine of individualism was a great asset. Having gained power, the liberal movement seems to have jettisoned this doctrine in an act of political expediency.
As in the old order, so in capitalism, the second-hander has a vast numerical majority in society. Now, further separated from the basic chores of his own survival by the fruits of capitalism, and in possession of ever greater amounts of leisure time, his frustration is magnified. The potential for new, contrary mass movements increases proportionately. The second-hander always has the power to shape his own intellect anew, to cultivate and express his own creative energy in whatever field and at whatever level his ability allows. But such a process, even when not begun on a second-handed precursor, is difficult and sometimes painful. The easier and more frequent shunt is a reversion to some form of collectivism.
In order to avert the disaster posed by modern collectivist movements, the liberal order was faced with two alternatives: (i) perfect the psychology of uncountable numbers of frustrated mediocrities or (ii) shunt them away from the revolutionary collectivism of modern mass movements and into the age-old collectivism of family and church. Fight syphilis by microscopic scrutiny of every resident microbe or by the equal-opportunity toxin of arsenic. The former (i) requires a grand, philosophical kind of revolution on at least the same order as the political revolutions being opposed -- a philosophic revolution whose very identity few in the liberal movement have ever grasped. The latter (ii) offers a concrete prospect for the current political epoch, and the liberal movement took it.
The danger is always that a dose of arsenic sufficient to subdue the invading microbe may be too great for the patient to withstand. But at least now I understand why the arsenic was tried in the first place. Ultimately, we need a better immunological technology.
Tuesday, December 11, 2007
Free Will vs. Quantum Indeterminism
Many scientists are determinists; they don't believe in free will. I do. Not only that, but I believe it is impossible to consistently deny it. If your thoughts and beliefs are determined by outside forces, then so is your belief in determinism. How do you know you believe in determinism because it is true? The outside forces clearly force a lot of people to believe false ideas, and not only that, but it is the forces themselves that determine whether people will ever be permitted to uncover the falsity of these ideas -- if the forces say no, then too bad, you're stuck with the mistakes forever, and you will have no way to know! Is determinism one of these mistakes? You will never know. This is Ayn Rand's argument against determinism.
A belief in determinism is an epistemic virus that infects any other beliefs you might hold. It is a one-way ticket to radical skepticism and thus equally self-defeating.
It might seem tempting to retort that with the advent of quantum mechanics determinism isn't really on the table anymore. Bohr giveth just as Newton tooketh away, on this view. Here are some problems with it:
1. Quantum mechanics isn't really about indeterminism.
It is true that Bohr and his students were radical indeterminists. What is not so well known is that Bohr held this view prior to even the discovery of matrix mechanics or the Schrodinger equation, much less any kind of semi-coherent formulation of the Copenhagen interpretation. That indeterminism was grafted onto quantum theory was an historical accident due primarily to Bohr's pre-existing philosophical committments, in particular his thoroughgoing rejection of causality. Apart from that accident it seems likely that Louis de Broglie's discovery of what David Bohm later developed into a fully consistent, realist (and also deterministic) interpretation of quantum theory would have prevailed. (The question of how this determinism is circumscribed by man's volition would remain.)
2. Epistemic nature of probability.
There has never been any basis whatsoever to transform what had been the purely epistemic concept of probability into something whose referents are out there in the external world. This transformation requires a kind of conspiracy theory about the meaning of quantum mechanics. Laplace & co. come up with the nice concept of mathematical probability that at the time everyone concedes was purely epistemic, describing our lack of complete knowledge in a given context. Then quantum mechanics comes along and we discover this amazing new phenomenon in nature, and fortuitously the exact concept we need to describe it already exists, with the slight difference that previously the concept had just been referring to stuff in our heads. It's as if a new discovery in electrical engineering brings about a revolution in our understanding of nano-electronics if we just accept the proposition that currents exhibit the emotions of happiness and sadness.
The idea that such a semantic maneuver is permitted by the open-ended nature of concepts misses the point. The question is not whether one is permitted to include these new referents under the concept of probability, the question is what new facts could possibly give us a reason to include them. Paraphrasing John Bell, both the observer-created-reality and indeterministic aspects of quantum mechanics are the result of premeditated theoretical preference, and are not in any way necessitated by experimental discoveries. The whole QM101 attitude of having to transform one's basic philosophy only grudgingly in recognition of new data is an affectation and a canard. (Zeilinger and Wheeler are perhaps the loudest living advocates of this canard.)
3. The actual meaning of quantum indeterminism.
Let's suppose for a moment that quantum indeterminism were the basis of free will. What would this mean exactly? Because the indeterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics are all terribly vague. The seat of indeterminism is supposed to be the wavefunction collapse event. And what causes this event? The "observer," answers quantum indeterminism. So there is no real physical foundation for free will provided here, there is only a vague, misplaced reference to some sort of consciousness. Yes, consciousness is an axiomatic concept that, logically, is irreducible. It is not, however, a concept that belongs in the axioms of a theory of physics, unless you want to posit mind as a new physical substance. Do not however presume that quantum mechanics provides some new, technical, empirical justification for this maneuver. There is not a single experiment that reveals anything unique about the physical matter of the brain in this regard. There is only an old theoretical preference that can be dressed up in modern clothes, and smeared with some gaudy quantum lipstick.
But another kind of interpretation of quantum mechanics exists (Bohm's), one that explains every experimental result in terms of, and situates every mathematical formulation within, a conventional kind of physical account -- an account that does not vaguely posit some new substance (mind-icles) for which no evidence exists. Only a desire to instantiate premeditated metaphysical beliefs could motivate the rejection of such a theory in favor of quantum free will.
Where does this leave us? Free will exists. Quantum mechanics doesn't tell us anything about it. Looks probable that free will and the mind are emergent phenomena -- emerging from a sufficiently complicated brain. We have barely even begun to understand the brain enough to have a clue as to how this works.
A belief in determinism is an epistemic virus that infects any other beliefs you might hold. It is a one-way ticket to radical skepticism and thus equally self-defeating.
It might seem tempting to retort that with the advent of quantum mechanics determinism isn't really on the table anymore. Bohr giveth just as Newton tooketh away, on this view. Here are some problems with it:
1. Quantum mechanics isn't really about indeterminism.
It is true that Bohr and his students were radical indeterminists. What is not so well known is that Bohr held this view prior to even the discovery of matrix mechanics or the Schrodinger equation, much less any kind of semi-coherent formulation of the Copenhagen interpretation. That indeterminism was grafted onto quantum theory was an historical accident due primarily to Bohr's pre-existing philosophical committments, in particular his thoroughgoing rejection of causality. Apart from that accident it seems likely that Louis de Broglie's discovery of what David Bohm later developed into a fully consistent, realist (and also deterministic) interpretation of quantum theory would have prevailed. (The question of how this determinism is circumscribed by man's volition would remain.)
2. Epistemic nature of probability.
There has never been any basis whatsoever to transform what had been the purely epistemic concept of probability into something whose referents are out there in the external world. This transformation requires a kind of conspiracy theory about the meaning of quantum mechanics. Laplace & co. come up with the nice concept of mathematical probability that at the time everyone concedes was purely epistemic, describing our lack of complete knowledge in a given context. Then quantum mechanics comes along and we discover this amazing new phenomenon in nature, and fortuitously the exact concept we need to describe it already exists, with the slight difference that previously the concept had just been referring to stuff in our heads. It's as if a new discovery in electrical engineering brings about a revolution in our understanding of nano-electronics if we just accept the proposition that currents exhibit the emotions of happiness and sadness.
The idea that such a semantic maneuver is permitted by the open-ended nature of concepts misses the point. The question is not whether one is permitted to include these new referents under the concept of probability, the question is what new facts could possibly give us a reason to include them. Paraphrasing John Bell, both the observer-created-reality and indeterministic aspects of quantum mechanics are the result of premeditated theoretical preference, and are not in any way necessitated by experimental discoveries. The whole QM101 attitude of having to transform one's basic philosophy only grudgingly in recognition of new data is an affectation and a canard. (Zeilinger and Wheeler are perhaps the loudest living advocates of this canard.)
3. The actual meaning of quantum indeterminism.
Let's suppose for a moment that quantum indeterminism were the basis of free will. What would this mean exactly? Because the indeterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics are all terribly vague. The seat of indeterminism is supposed to be the wavefunction collapse event. And what causes this event? The "observer," answers quantum indeterminism. So there is no real physical foundation for free will provided here, there is only a vague, misplaced reference to some sort of consciousness. Yes, consciousness is an axiomatic concept that, logically, is irreducible. It is not, however, a concept that belongs in the axioms of a theory of physics, unless you want to posit mind as a new physical substance. Do not however presume that quantum mechanics provides some new, technical, empirical justification for this maneuver. There is not a single experiment that reveals anything unique about the physical matter of the brain in this regard. There is only an old theoretical preference that can be dressed up in modern clothes, and smeared with some gaudy quantum lipstick.
But another kind of interpretation of quantum mechanics exists (Bohm's), one that explains every experimental result in terms of, and situates every mathematical formulation within, a conventional kind of physical account -- an account that does not vaguely posit some new substance (mind-icles) for which no evidence exists. Only a desire to instantiate premeditated metaphysical beliefs could motivate the rejection of such a theory in favor of quantum free will.
Where does this leave us? Free will exists. Quantum mechanics doesn't tell us anything about it. Looks probable that free will and the mind are emergent phenomena -- emerging from a sufficiently complicated brain. We have barely even begun to understand the brain enough to have a clue as to how this works.
Friday, December 7, 2007
Ron Paul
Profound ambivalence is my reaction to the Ronvolution. What has always struck me about Paul is something that's not quite intellectual honesty, but intellectual earnestness. I am convinced this man wants to have justice done. When he's in one of his finance committee hearings with Greenspan or Bernanke, you can hear in his voice a plea to be understood -- sound money, not government paper, it's so simple.
And yet Paul also holds that 9/11 is in some important measure our fault, or at least the fault of our government, which has maintained military installations in Saudi Arabia and friendly relations with Israel. These are the canards that Osama bin Laden proffers as grievances when attempting to confuse and divide Western enemies.
Paul has bought into this as a way to reduce the problem of global jihad back to the previous problem. For big-L Libertarians like Ron Paul, the previous problem is always the U.S. government. It is an understandable mistake when your intellectual foundation goes only as far down as politics (the non-initiation of force principle). If the most basic good for man is freedom to pursue his own values, then the most basic evil is force directed against those values. And in terms of dollars expropriated, the U.S. government is the greatest transgressor in human history.
But when you realize that political ideas ultimately derive from a view of man's nature, in particular the nature and role of his reasoning mind, a more basic alternative can be perceived. The jihadis are not motivated by a desire for liberation from American interference, they seek a global Islamic revolution to enforce world-wide spiritual submission. Their current stance is mostly defensive only of necessity. But the existence of transportable nuclear weapons transforms the long-term strategic equation. The anti-intellectual straitjacket of Libertarianism makes it difficult to grasp the jihadi's actual goal and how serious he is about finding a means capable of achieving it.
And yet Paul also holds that 9/11 is in some important measure our fault, or at least the fault of our government, which has maintained military installations in Saudi Arabia and friendly relations with Israel. These are the canards that Osama bin Laden proffers as grievances when attempting to confuse and divide Western enemies.
Paul has bought into this as a way to reduce the problem of global jihad back to the previous problem. For big-L Libertarians like Ron Paul, the previous problem is always the U.S. government. It is an understandable mistake when your intellectual foundation goes only as far down as politics (the non-initiation of force principle). If the most basic good for man is freedom to pursue his own values, then the most basic evil is force directed against those values. And in terms of dollars expropriated, the U.S. government is the greatest transgressor in human history.
But when you realize that political ideas ultimately derive from a view of man's nature, in particular the nature and role of his reasoning mind, a more basic alternative can be perceived. The jihadis are not motivated by a desire for liberation from American interference, they seek a global Islamic revolution to enforce world-wide spiritual submission. Their current stance is mostly defensive only of necessity. But the existence of transportable nuclear weapons transforms the long-term strategic equation. The anti-intellectual straitjacket of Libertarianism makes it difficult to grasp the jihadi's actual goal and how serious he is about finding a means capable of achieving it.
Thursday, November 22, 2007
N! in the Classical Partition Function
I remember sitting through an undergrad stat mech lecture, I think in my senior year, when the professor wrote down the classical partition function for an ideal gas, and made the comment that despite popular misconception this N! appearing in the denominator really didn't have anything to do with the quantum mechanics of identical particles.
Now this sounded like a good philosophic kind of question to sink my teeth into, and I kind of enjoyed the bravely reactionary nature of his comment. I mean if you have an easy 1/N! from QM, why not use it, eh? He must have had a profound reason, although one he didn't seem able to share with us at the time.
The nasty part of this question is that, even forgetting about QM for a second, it seems to put a hard-nosed stat mech result square in the middle of a grand metaphysical problem. Gibbs justified the 1/N! by asserting that the particles are identical (albeit in a merely Luddite, classical way) and that two configurations which differ merely by, say, an exchange of two particle positions aren't "really" distinct. Well why not? I mean they are two different particles. Suppose that we probe a bit deeper and found that no two electrons are really identical, that at a very small scale they had little scratches or barbs or something that were unique little fingerprints. Doesn't matter how small the scratches -- if there are scratches -- blammo! the 1/N! has to go away. Apparently then even the approximate validity of classical stat mech is a metaphysical beacon signaling to us that every single goddam electron is exactly the same.
However, there is a less metaphysical possibility: the particles aren't particles, they're excitations of some kind of field. Then it's not really the case that particle1 here and particle2 there is distinct from particle2 here and particle1 there. What we really have is just field excited both here and there, symmetrically. Now I won't bother here about the fact that this is precisely the state of affairs described by QFT. Could just as well have been a classical field, same result. Bottom line is, stat mech isn't subtley warning us about the inherently quantum nature of our universe, and it isn't telling us something about the metaphysical sameness of all electrons. It's telling us, it ain't particles at all -- it's fields.
Now this sounded like a good philosophic kind of question to sink my teeth into, and I kind of enjoyed the bravely reactionary nature of his comment. I mean if you have an easy 1/N! from QM, why not use it, eh? He must have had a profound reason, although one he didn't seem able to share with us at the time.
The nasty part of this question is that, even forgetting about QM for a second, it seems to put a hard-nosed stat mech result square in the middle of a grand metaphysical problem. Gibbs justified the 1/N! by asserting that the particles are identical (albeit in a merely Luddite, classical way) and that two configurations which differ merely by, say, an exchange of two particle positions aren't "really" distinct. Well why not? I mean they are two different particles. Suppose that we probe a bit deeper and found that no two electrons are really identical, that at a very small scale they had little scratches or barbs or something that were unique little fingerprints. Doesn't matter how small the scratches -- if there are scratches -- blammo! the 1/N! has to go away. Apparently then even the approximate validity of classical stat mech is a metaphysical beacon signaling to us that every single goddam electron is exactly the same.
However, there is a less metaphysical possibility: the particles aren't particles, they're excitations of some kind of field. Then it's not really the case that particle1 here and particle2 there is distinct from particle2 here and particle1 there. What we really have is just field excited both here and there, symmetrically. Now I won't bother here about the fact that this is precisely the state of affairs described by QFT. Could just as well have been a classical field, same result. Bottom line is, stat mech isn't subtley warning us about the inherently quantum nature of our universe, and it isn't telling us something about the metaphysical sameness of all electrons. It's telling us, it ain't particles at all -- it's fields.
Another Missfire at Bell's Inequality
[Adapted from an HBL post] Yet another claimed refutation of Bell's Inequality surfaces here, this one on the part of someone named Joy Christian. Bell's Inequality, together with certain well-confirmed experimental results, demonstrates faster-than-light (in physics parlance, 'non-local') causation in nature, one important feature of quantum mechanics.
However, Christian's conclusions aren't supported in his paper. What he does is to suggest an experiment that is distinct from Bell's and then argue that this experiment can be explained by a local theory. But that doesn't change the fact that Bell's original experiment cannot be explained in such a way.
Christian's experiment involves measuring variables, the Clifford Algebra elements denoted by A_n(mu) in his paper, which are mathematically more complicated than Bell's original ones (simple binary numbers). Christian seems to be equivocating between a change in these measured variables and a change in the "hidden variables" used to define a theory, as if simply defining a new experiment with new variables to measure were somehow equivalent to explaining the original experiment with a new set of hidden variables, i.e. a new proposed theory.
Incidentally, New Scientist has become a meaningless publication insofar as claims of new ideas in physics are concerned.
However, Christian's conclusions aren't supported in his paper. What he does is to suggest an experiment that is distinct from Bell's and then argue that this experiment can be explained by a local theory. But that doesn't change the fact that Bell's original experiment cannot be explained in such a way.
Christian's experiment involves measuring variables, the Clifford Algebra elements denoted by A_n(mu) in his paper, which are mathematically more complicated than Bell's original ones (simple binary numbers). Christian seems to be equivocating between a change in these measured variables and a change in the "hidden variables" used to define a theory, as if simply defining a new experiment with new variables to measure were somehow equivalent to explaining the original experiment with a new set of hidden variables, i.e. a new proposed theory.
Incidentally, New Scientist has become a meaningless publication insofar as claims of new ideas in physics are concerned.
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